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Change the IPTables log file

21/10/2026 Comments off

An important aspect of any firewall are the log files. Iptables on Linux provides logging functionality, however by default, it will get outputted to the /var/log/messages log file. This can clutter things up, and make it hard to check the logs.

If you want to change the file that IPTables logs to, you need to set up your iptables rules to output a log prefix. Rsyslog will then be configured to pick up this prefix, and output the information to a custom log file, containing just the iptables log information.
Install rsyslog if it is not already installed.

$ sudo apt-get install -y rsyslog

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Categories: Réseau, Système Tags: , , ,

Voyage au centre du noyau: Traffic Control, la QoS

17/10/2026 Comments off

Gérer la QoS.

On peut aujourd’hui largement envisager d’héberger un ou plusieurs services sur son serveur à domicile, et des mouvements comme auto-hebergement.fr l’on bien illustré. Reste le problème de la bande passante en upload, qui bien que largement suffisante pour héberger des serveurs web, email, jabber ou autre, reste à utiliser intelligemment.

Linux fournit cette intelligence, sous forme d’un scheduler de paquets nommé Traffic Control (TC, pour les intimes), et l’objectif de cet article est de présenter cette technologie et sa mise en place dans un cas d’étude d’hébergement Web, DNS et même BitTorrent. Notons au passage que bon nombre de scripts et programmes existent pour simplifier la mise en place de la QoS (Quality of Service). Citons Wondershaper, Shorewall, ADSL-Optimizer par exemple. Cet article n’en parlera pas, car l’objectif est ici de faire mais aussi de comprendre comment ça marche sous le capot, et pour ça, il faut démonter le moteur et mettre les mains dans le cambouis.

1. Traffic Control, la QoS, les bases

Traffic Control travaille sur les paquets sortant du noyau. Il n’a pas, initialement, pour objectif de contrôler le trafic des paquets entrants. Cette portion de code du noyau se situe entre la couche IP et le pilote du matériel qui transmet sur le réseau. On est donc très bas dans les couches. En réalité, c’est Traffic Control qui est constamment en charge de transmettre au driver de la carte réseau le paquet à envoyer.

figure1-tcgeneral

Cela signifie, en fait, que le module TC – le scheduler de paquet – est en permanence activé dans le noyau, même quand vous ne pensez pas l’utiliser. Par défaut, ce scheduler maintient une queue (prononcer kiou, une file d’attente) similaire à FIFO dans laquelle le premier paquet entré est donc le premier sortit.

La base de TC est la Queuing Discipline (qdisc) qui représente la politique de scheduling appliquée à une queue. Il existe différentes qdisc. Comme pour le scheduling processeur, on retrouve les méthodes FIFO, FIFO à plusieurs files, FIFO avec hash et round robin (SFQ). On a également un système Token Bucket Filter (TBF) qui attribue des jetons (tokens) à une qdisc pour en limiter le débit (pas de token = pas de transmission = on attend d’avoir un jeton disponible). Cette dernière politique a ensuite été étendue à un TBF hiérarchique, le HTB (Hierarchical Token Bucket). Les politiques que nous allons étudier ici sont TBF, qui pose les fondamentaux, SFQ et HTB. Nous allons également jeter un coup d’oeil à la politique par défaut, que, tout Monsieur Jourdain que nous sommes, nous utilisons sans le savoir: pfifo_fast.

1.1 Premier contact

Jean-Kevin est pressé, il n’a pas de temps à perdre, et tout de suite maintenant, il doit limiter la bande passante sortante de son serveur web à 200kbits par secondes (25ko/s). Au diable la théorie, on y reviendra plus tard, mettons tout de suite les mains dans le cambouis. La mécanique que nous allons mettre en place est simple. Nous allons utiliser une règle Netfilter pour marquer les paquets qui nous intéressent. Ensuite, nous allons fournir à TC une politique qui s’appliquera sur les paquets contenant la marque définie. C’est parti.

1.2 Netfilter MARK

Netfilter permet d’interagir directement avec la structure représentant un paquet dans le noyau. Cette structure, le sk_buff, possède un champ « __u32 nfmark » que l’on va renseigner et qui sera lu par le filtre de TC pour sélectionner la classe de destination du paquet. La règle iptables suivante va appliquer la marque ’80’ sur les paquets sortant (chaine OUTPUT) ayant pour port source le port 80:

# iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp --sport 80 -j MARK --set-mark 80

On peut vérifier que cette règle est bien appliquée aux paquets sortants en visualisant les statistiques de Netfilter.

# iptables -L OUTPUT -t mangle -v
Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT 74107 packets, 109M bytes)
 pkts bytes target prot opt in  out  source   destination
73896  109M MARK   tcp  --  any eth0 anywhere anywhere    tcp spt:www MARK xset 0x50/0xffffffff

1.3 Deux classes dans un arbre

Le binaire /sbin/tc est compris dans le package iproute (sous Debian). Un simple aptitude suffit à l’installer, s’il ne l’est pas déjà. Nous allons créer un arbre dont la racine appliquera la politique HTB. Cet arbre va contenir deux classes: une pour notre trafic marqué, l’autre pour tout le reste et qui sera donc considérée par défaut.

# tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: htb default 20
# tc class add dev eth0 parent 1:0 classid 1:10 htb rate 200kbit ceil 200kbit prio 1 mtu 1500
# tc class add dev eth0 parent 1:0 classid 1:20 htb rate 1024kbit ceil 1024kbit prio 2 mtu 1500

Les deux classes filles sont raccrochés à la racine. Ces classes possèdent un débit garantie (rate) et un débit maximal opportuniste (ceil). Si la bande passante n’est pas utilisée, alors une classe pourra monter son débit jusqu’à la valeur de ceil. Sinon c’est la valeur de rate qui s’applique. Cela veut dire que la somme des valeurs de rate doit correspondre à la bande passante disponible. Dans le cas d’un upload ADSL classique chez un fournisseur correct, cela sera d’environ 1024kbits (dans le meilleur des cas, éloignement du DSLAM, etc…).

Nous avons maintenant d’un côté un arbre de contrôle de trafic, et d’un autre côté du marquage de paquets. Il reste donc à relier les deux. Cela est fait avec les règles de filtrage de TC. Ces règles sont très simples. On dit à TC de prendre en charge (handle) les paquets portant la marque 80 et de les envoyer (fw flowid) à la classe correspondante. Un point important toutefois, un filtre doit être rattaché à la racine « root » de l’arbre. Sinon, il n’est pas pris en compte.

# tc filter add dev eth0 parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 1 handle 80 fw flowid 1:10

Faisons maintenant le test avec NetCat, on ouvre un port en écoute qui renvoi des zéro. C’est basique et parfait pour tester notre politique. On lance donc :

# nc -l -p 80 < /dev/zero

Et sur une autre machine, on lance un telnet vers le port 80 de la machine en écoute. L’outil iptraf permet de visualiser la connexion en cours et, surtout, son débit (voir figure 2).

figure2-debitqos

Comme on le voit dans l’encadré rouge, en bas à droite, le débit de la connexion est de 199,20kbps. On s’approche de beaucoup des 200kbps, la précision dépendant quelques paramètres que nous allons étudier. Si l’on teste une connexion du même type sur un autre port, on verra un débit limité à 1024kbps, ce qui correspond au débit de la classe par défaut qui s’applique à tous les paquets non marqués.

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SIP Server IPTABLES Sample firewall Rules !

15/10/2026 Comments off

SIP Server protection

IPtables rules

iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 5060 -m string –string "REGISTER sip:" –algo bm -m recent –set –name VOIP –rsource
iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 5060 -m string –string "REGISTER sip:" –algo bm -m recent –update –seconds 60 –hitcount 12 –rttl –name VOIP –rsource -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 5060 -m string –string "INVITE sip:" –algo bm -m recent –set –name VOIPINV –rsource
iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 5060 -m string –string "INVITE sip:" –algo bm -m recent –update –seconds 60 –hitcount 12 –rttl –name VOIPINV –rsource -j DROP
iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m hashlimit –hashlimit 6/sec –hashlimit-mode srcip,dstport –hashlimit-name tunnel_limit -m udp –dport 5060 -j ACCEPT
iptables -I INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 5060 -j DROP

# RTP – the media stream
# (related to the port range in /etc/asterisk/rtp.conf)
iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 10000:20000 -j ACCEPT

# MGCP – if you use media gateway control protocol in your configuration
iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp –dport 2727 -j ACCEPT

Sample script

#!/bin/bash
EXIF="eth0"
# Clear any existing firewall stuff before we start
/sbin/iptables –flush
# As the default policies, drop all incoming traffic but allow all
# outgoing traffic. This will allow us to make outgoing connections
# from any port, but will only allow incoming connections on the ports
# specified below.
# Allow connections from my machines
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF -m state –state NEW -s 109.161.251.214 -j ACCEPT
/sbin/iptables –policy INPUT DROP
/sbin/iptables –policy OUTPUT ACCEPT
# Allow all incoming traffic if it is coming from the local loopback device
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# Accept all incoming traffic associated with an established connection, or a "related" connection
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -i $EXIF -m state –state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
# Check new packets are SYN packets for syn-flood protection
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp ! –syn -m state –state NEW -j DROP
# Drop fragmented packets
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -f -j DROP
# Drop malformed XMAS packets
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp –tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP
# Drop null packets
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp –tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP
# Allow connections to port (4501) – ssh. You can add other ports you need in here
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF –dport 4501 -m state –state NEW -j ACCEPT
# Allow connections to port (4500) – Webmin . You can add other ports you need in here
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF –dport 4500 -m state –state NEW -j ACCEPT
# Allow connections to port (80&443) – www. You can add other ports you need in here
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF –dport 80 -m state –state NEW -j ACCEPT
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF –dport 443 -m state –state NEW -j ACCEPT
# Allow connections from my machines
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF -m state –state NEW -s 80.241.212.93 -j ACCEPT
# Allow SIP connections
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p udp -i $EXIF –dport 5060 -m udp -j ACCEPT
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -i $EXIF –dport 5060 -m tcp -j ACCEPT
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p udp -i $EXIF –dport 10000:20000 -m udp -j ACCEPT
# Allow icmp input so that people can ping us
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -p icmp –icmp-type 8 -m state –state NEW -j ACCEPT
# Log then drop any packets that are not allowed. You will probably want to turn off the logging
#/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -j LOG
/sbin/iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT

Source: Ahmad Sabry ElGendi

http://sysadminman.net/blog/2008/iptables-for-asterisk-49

http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/Asterisk+firewall+rules

Categories: Réseau, Sécurité Tags: ,

Neat tricks with iptables

10/10/2026 Comments off

tricks iptablesNeat tricks with iptables: The past few months have seen me digging deep into the world of TCP/IP and firewalls. It has been a fascinating journey into packet queueing and TCP headers, three-way handshakes and ICMP broadcasts.

The result of this research has been the ongoing creation of a firewall to protect my laptop against open networks, and my Internet server from port scanning and DoS attacks. I’m pretty certain I haven’t even scratched the surface yet, but I have found some settings to protect against the most common attacks. Below I’ll summarize the major pieces of my new firewall, and the logic behind it.

Address spoofing: win with iptables

The easiest way to fool a server is to construct a packet that whose source address is faked, or spoofed. This is surprisingly easy to do. To craft packets, I use a very powerful network analysis tool called Scapy. Scapy will allow you to create packets on the fly, transmit them, and scan your network for any response.

For example, let’s say I’m on my local network (which I am right now, as I write this), connected via wireless as192.168.15.113. I’m going to interact with the router, which is at 192.168.15.1. For the purposes of analysis, I’ve also setup a virtual machine running on 192.168.15.114, so I can see what happens when I spoof the packet.

So, let’s say I spoof an ICMP echo-request packet, sent to .1 (router) from .113 (me) but spoofed as if it had come from .114 (virtual machine). In Scapy this is quite easy to do. I run two scapy session in two terminal windows. In the first I type:

>>> send(IP(src="192.168.15.114", dst="192.168.15.1")/ICMP())
.
Sent 1 packets.

Although my machine is at .113, I’m telling scapy to set the source address for the ICMP echo-request packet to.114, which is the host I want to attack. I’m sending this “ping” to the router, which should now send its response back to .114 instead of me.

In my other terminal window, I run scapy again, this time in promiscuous mode as a packet sniffer. Promiscuous mode means that it will capture all packets seen on the network, not just those destined for my own machine. Here’s what I see:

>>> sniff(filter="icmp")
^C
>>> _.show()
0000 Ether / IP / ICMP 192.168.15.114 > 192.168.15.1 echo-request 0
0001 Ether / IP / ICMP 192.168.15.1 > 192.168.15.114 echo-reply 0

I ran the sniffer, then did the ping, then stopped the sniffer by pressing Control-C. I can see that two ICMP packets were seen during the sniff. By showing the contents of these packets, I can see both the packet that I transmitted, and the response – which came back to .114!

That’s a spoof. How can it be used to attack someone? Read on in the next section, since what we just did forms the basis for a smurf attack.

Some packet spoofs, however, are more obvious. For example, a packet coming from the Internet bound for a private IP address or certain broadcast addresses, such as address beginning with 192.168 or 224. These are never valid, so it’s a good idea to drop such packets immediately upon receipt. Here are the iptables rules to do this:

# Reject packets from RFC1918 class networks (i.e., spoofed)
iptables -A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/8     -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 169.254.0.0/16 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 172.16.0.0/12  -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 127.0.0.0/8    -j DROP

iptables -A INPUT -s 224.0.0.0/4      -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -d 224.0.0.0/4      -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 240.0.0.0/5      -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -d 240.0.0.0/5      -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -s 0.0.0.0/8        -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -d 0.0.0.0/8        -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -d 239.255.255.0/24 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -d 255.255.255.255  -j DROP

Here’s the same thing, now for ipfw users:

# Verify the reverse path to help avoid spoofed packets.  This means any
# packet coming from a particular interface must have an address matching the
# netmask for that interface.
ipfw add 100 deny all from any to any not verrevpath in

# Deny all inbound traffic from RFC1918 address spaces (spoof!)
ipfw add 110 deny all from 192.168.0.0/16 to any in
ipfw add 120 deny all from 172.16.0.0/12 to any in
ipfw add 130 deny all from 10.0.0.0/8 to any in
ipfw add 140 deny all from 127.0.0.0/8 to any in

ipfw add 150 deny all from 224.0.0.0/4 to any in
ipfw add 160 deny all from any to 224.0.0.0/4 in
ipfw add 170 deny all from 240.0.0.0/5 to any in
ipfw add 180 deny all from any to 240.0.0.0/5 in
ipfw add 190 deny all from 0.0.0.0/8 to any in
ipfw add 200 deny all from any to 0.0.0.0/8 in
ipfw add 210 deny all from any to 239.255.255.0/24 in
ipfw add 220 deny all from any to 255.255.255.255 in

Lire la suite…

Categories: Réseau, Sécurité Tags: ,

iptables revisited: a not so ordinary ‘firewall’

09/10/2026 Comments off

iptables revisited

Source: Per Linde, Martynas Pumputis and Guillermo Rodr ́ıguez iptables revisited: a not so ordinary ‘firewall’

iptables revisited: Abstract

At the present time, security on the internet, and networks in general have evolved, and become an issue that should not be disregarded. It is well known that many experts recommend Linux as the main operating system for the machines that have to be in charge of security (also for a desktop computer). Linux included a basic firewall tool called ipchains in the series of its kernel until 2.4 version, though after that version it switched to iptables. iptables is known for its efficiency and functionality, but the enormous functionality means a more complex tool to be configured. This paper will overview some mechanisms to do advanced configuration of iptables based on two main scenarios. The different configurations presented will try to prove the remarkable power of iptables as an independent firewall and also as a tool that can work in conjuntion with other tools usually incorporated when included this one.

Introduction

iptables is a firewall developed by the Netfilter Project 1 . Presently, this firewall is becoming more and more popular (both among end users and network administrators). The popularity of this firewall it closely related to Linux operating system, because iptables works with Linux kernels 2.4 and 2.6 and almost every major Linux distribution comes with pre-installed iptables firewall. This firewall is also known as a stateful packet filter. It is a main difference between iptables and ipchains (an ancestor of iptables that was used with Linux kernel versions up to 2.4). The firewall supports not only a packet filtering, but it is also able to log, forward packets and it could be used together with such tools as psad, snort, etc. In this paper we will look a bit deeper into more advance iptables configurations, but first of all, we would like to introduce a reader to a basic usage of iptables. The core of the firewall consists of four parts [7]: tables, chains, matches and targets. A system administrator is able to define an iptables policy, i.e. tables of chains, which describe how a kernel should react against different groups of packets. Rules are used to create a chain – collection of rules that is applied to every packet. There are five predefined chains:

  • INPUT: used for incoming packets before routing.
  • OUTPUT: used for packets coming into the box itself.
  • FORWARD: used for packets being routed through the box.
  • PREROUTING: used for locally-generated packets before routing.
  • POSTROUTING: used for packets as they about to leave iptables.

Every rule should have a set of matches, that helps to filter packets (e.g. -d 10.100.1.1 matches a destination IP 10.100.1.1), and it also has to have a target – an action which should be performed when a rule matches on a packet (e.g. ACCEPT, DROP, LOG…). All the examples presented in this paper (excluding the one used at section 6) will be based on the scenario presented in the figure 1. In the following scenario, WebServer#1 (10.100.1.101 assigned to its ‘eth0’ interface), WebServer#2 (10.100.1.102 assigned to its ‘eth0’ interface) and PC (10.100.1.33 assigned to its ‘eth0’ interface) belong to a local network and every packet that comes from the Internet/LAN is filtered by the firewall (‘eth1’ interface for LAN’s traffic, ‘eth0’ for Internet’s traffic). PC (212.59.0.1 assigned to ‘eth0’ interface) is reachable directly through the Internet. Capture du 2016-04-19 17:53:32 The listing 1 shows a couple of rules, the first one appends a rule to the end of the INPUT chain and it specifies that every packet from the source with IP address 212.59.0.1 will beDROPed and the second rule logs all outgoing connections from eth1 interface.

iptables -A INPUT -s 212.59.0.1 -j DROP
iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth1 -j LOG

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